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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Policy Research Working Paper 5241
This paper offers a preliminary assessment of the potential 
benefits and costs of an economic and monetary union 
(EMU) between the Dominican Republic and Haiti—
two countries sharing the same island but whose history 
is one of conflict and divergent economic prospects 
in recent decades. After a brief review of the historical 
context, it examines the nature of these potential benefits 
and costs. It then conducts a preliminary analysis (using 
basic statistical techniques) of some key criteria for the 
formation of an economic and monetary union between 
the two countries. A more formal analysis of business 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, Latin American and the Caribbean Region—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to understand the issues associated with economic and monetary unions between 
developing countries in the region. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The author may be contacted at epintomoreira@worldbank.org or epintomoreira@imf.org. 
cycle synchronization, based on basic and extended 
integrated vector auto-regression models with exogenous 
variables (VARX), is developed next. Overall, the analysis 
suggests that at this stage several economic criteria are 
not satisfied for the two countries to fully benefit from 
an economic and monetary union. At the same time, 
however, the endogeneity of most of these criteria 
(including the degree of business cycle synchronization) 
militates in favor of an aggressive medium-term agenda 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic opened bilateral trade only 20 years ago with the 
hope of creating economic integration. Trade and migration have increased significantly, and 
the two nations are now taking steps to establish systems and structures to manage this 
relationship, with support from various quarters.  In July 2008 for instance, the U.S. 
government and the Organization of American States provided funding for a new program 
aimed at increasing economic growth and cooperation along the 193-mile border between 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic.  The program, called “Fwontye Nou/Nuestra Frontera” in 
Creole and Spanish (“Our Border” in English), aims to provide training, technical assistance, 
and conditions to foster cross-border projects and productive investments for both countries. 
The European Union has also begun to finance joint projects along the border. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of the 
historical context. Section III discusses the potential benefits and costs of an economic and 
monetary union between the two countries.  Section IV offers a preliminary analysis of some 
key EMU criteria, using basic statistical techniques (unconditional correlations), as in some 
other contributions (see for instance Karras (2007) and Furceri and Karras (2008)). Section V 
develops a more formal analysis of business cycle synchronization based on two integrated 
(two-country) VARX models: A “basic” model involving output gaps and inflation (measured 
in terms of deviations with respect to US inflation) in the two countries, and the US output 
gap, and an extended model, which adds other “external” variables (the world price of oil and 
the US real interest rate) and domestic variables (bank credit to the private sector as a share of 
GDP and bilateral real exchange rates). The models are used to analyze the response of 
domestic output and inflation to external and domestic shocks. Section VI draws together the 
policy implication of the analysis and offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
History and geography bind the Dominican Republic and Haiti.  On December 6, 
1492, Christopher Columbus discovered an island that he qualified as “marvelous” and named 
it Hispaniola.  The formation of these two states and their accession to independence is a long 
story marked by wars and reconciliations, open or hidden hostility and alliances against 




st 1798, Toussaint Louverture took control of the whole island after 
ousting foreign troupes, both English and French
1.   On August 1
st 1800, he became the only 
                                                 
1 On October 1
st 1798, English troupes left the place “Mole Saint Nicolas”, last area under their control. On 
October 22, 1798, Toussaint Louverture obliged French Governor General Hedouville to leave the island for 
France.      4 
master of the French part of Santo Domingo after defeating his rival, General Rigaud. On 
January 26, 1801, he took control of the Spanish part of Santo Domingo and became the only 
commander in chief of the entire island. He legitimized his power by elaborating a 
constitution, approved on July 7, 1801, which gave him all the powers, legislative and 
executive and allow him to serve as Governor for his lifetime.  
 
But Toussaint Louverture’s power was short lived. The French troups sent by 
Napoleon Bonaparte, under the commandment of his brother-in-law General Victoire-
Emmanuel Leclerc, entered in a two-year war with Toussaint Louverture’s army. The war 
ended with the death of General Victoire-Emmanuel Leclerc on November 2
nd, 1802 and the 
captivity, deportation, and death in prison of Toussaint Louverture on April 7
th 1803. These 
events were followed by the granting of independence to Haiti on January 1
st, 1804.  
 
After a year of peaceful relationships, in 1805, General Jean-Jacques Dessalines, first 
President of Haiti after the country gained its independence, launched a new war against the 
East cost of the island (Santo Domingo). But the war was short-lived as General Dessalines 
feared retaliation by the French Government.   
 
In 1820, a new unification attempt was launched by President Jean-Pierre Boyer. At 
that time, Spanish people of Santo Domingo were divided between two groups on the choice 
of their political regime. One group was in the view that independence of the Spanish part of 
the island was illusory because of the small population. Some advocated a union with 
Colombia, which had just gained independence. Others called for a fusion with Haiti.  
In this context, President Boyer used his diplomatic skills to convince Dominicans to go with 
the unification of the island. On February 1822, his troups entered in Santo Domingo. 
However, his policy of “Haitianization” of the whole island disappointed many inhabitants of 
the island including Haitians themselves. In January 1843, a revolution called “Revolution 
Praslin” under the commandment of Riviere Herard took place. After being defeated, 
President Boyer left the country on March 13, 1843, after 25 years of power. Dominicans 
ultimately proclaimed their independence on February 1844, following Riviere Herard’s 
decision to close all ports of the East Coast to external trading.     
 
After a war launched by Riviere Herard to constrain Dominicans to renounce to 
independence in 1845, and the invasion of the Dominican Republic in March 1849 by Faustin 
Soulouque (who succeeded President Jean Baptiste Riche), the Dominican Republic 
reinforced its independence by approving a national constitution.    
 
The following years were marked by attempts to sign agreements between the two 
countries. On November 9, 1874, the two countries signed the first treaty of peace, friendship, 
trade, and extradition of criminals between them. This treaty established the principle of a 
customs union between the two countries. It also confirmed the  economic and trade 
dominance of Haiti over its East neighbor.  This resulted in Dominicans using Haitian trade 
and port services for their external trade. The treaty also entailed a financial support of the 
Haitian Government to the Dominican Republic, with a view to avoid that DR search for 
financial assistant to compensate for land losses. 
   5 
However, these trade union efforts were stopped by the US occupation of the island 
for 19 years on the Haitian side (July 28, 1915 to August 21
st, 1934) and 8 years on the 
Dominican side (October 29, 1916 to October 21, 1924).  
 
Following the departure of the US from the DR and the election of President Horacio 
Vasques on March 15, 1924 and Louis Borno on April 10, 1922, the issue of borders was 
sorted out. A treaty was signed on January 21
st 1929 and approved by Congress in the 
Dominican Republic on February 7, 1929, which establishes the borders between the two 
countries.  The treaty was ratified by Haiti on February 15, 1929 and by the Dominican 
Republic on February 25, 1929.        
 
Despite being independent countries, DR and Haiti share common characteristics. 
They share the same island space (Quisqueya or Hispaniola 76 780 km
2, the second largest in 
the Caribbean). They display similarities in natural resources endowments and exhibit clear 
common traits, both cultural and socio-economic. The two countries have always maintained 
intense commercial exchanges and cultural ties, whether formal or informal, legal or illegal. 
Haiti is the third largest export market for the Dominican Republic; conversely, the DR is the 
first export market for Haiti. Haiti is the primary source of migrants for the DR.  For 
thousands of Haitians, migration provides the way to employment in the DR as well as an 
escape valve for the pressure created by overpopulation and land scarcity at home; for others, 
political instability at home (n addition to economic needs) has led to voluntary exile in the 
DR. During the 1990s, some 30,000 Haitians were entering the DR each year, and about half 
that number was repatriated. Some 150,000 Haitian who remained from the previous 20 years 
would make a total of 250,000-300,000 emigrés, and these would join the estimated 100,000 
Dominicans  born of Haitian parents. The presencia haitiana in Dominican society could 
therefore involve, by this reckoning, some 350,000-400,000 persons of Haitian descent, 
whether born in Haiti or in the DR.  Cultural and intellectual exchanges between the two 
countries have always been intense, especially along the border as well as among the elites at 
the national level.  
 
The Dominican economy needs Haitian labor and its industry depends largely on this 
source of manpower.  A scarcity of land on the Haitian side continues to push peasants toward 
the east and to the north. The frontier markets and contraband trade indicate that, despite the 
stereotypes and notwithstanding the barriers to immigration, a vigorous economic life has 
created borderland ‘communities”, which offer a flexible pattern of culture more 
accommodating of otherness than that of the interior zones. There is a fluidity and seeming 
ease with social interactions, including exchange of language (Haitian Kreyol and Spanish). 
Another type of exchange involves money, the Haitian gourde being valued here as is the 
Dominican peso. Intermarriages occur frequently, mostly of Dominican men with Haitian 
women.  The exchanges of the borderlands remind people of the two countries that they share 
a background that embraces the history of colonialism, the experience of underdevelopment, 
and the struggle to survive.    6 
 
 
Despite similarities and common traits, however, the growth patterns and outcomes 
achieved by the countries in recent decades have been widely different.  The DR has gone 
successfully through a transition to lower middle-income status with substantial economic 
growth.  Haiti has lagged behind in all aspects of socio-economic development. 
 
  However, articulations and interdependencies are already a fact.  With such 
interdependencies in mind, Muñoz (1995) correctly states that the “superstructural frame” that 
integrates countries into multinational blocs is not nationalities, but rather markets. Although 
“national identity and consciousness, by their own nature, cannot be negotiable”- in the sense 
that they have their own dynamic coherence – they do have functions within the nation-state 
system articulated by economics and migration.
2   In fact, it may be argued that the sheer 
differences between the two countries create mutually beneficial situations building on their 
individual comparative advantages.  Hence, by acting jointly and/or in a coordinated fashion 
in key areas, individual growth outcomes can be enhanced.  
 
Interdependence and cultural exchange continue within the asymmetrical frame of the 
Haitian and Dominican Republics. The problem of their contiguous coexistence, together with 
the flow of migrants across the shared border, expresses the situation of two states whose 
populations must seek the ad hoc solutions to social ills by mean of emigration.  
 
Integration could be realized in a fair and efficient regulation of the commercial traffic 
between the two countries. Such regulation would facilitate trade while providing for the 
revenue needed to develop each country’s infrastructure.  Thriving commerce in the frontier 
towns already indicates ways in which a less encumbered cross-border trade can profit the 
two national economies. In the Haitian southeast, Haitians and Dominicans come to do 
business at the rural market of Fonds-Verettes, Situated at a crossroads of major access routes. 
The market draws farmers, hawkers, and retail dealers from towns like Perdernales, Saltrou, 
Neiba, and Barahona. As illustrated in the example of Fonds-Verettes, informal linkages of 
commerce and culture have blurred the division between nations. They also point to the fact 
that Haitian and Dominican “sister towns” have become interdependent. Such pairings 
include not only Dajabón and Ouanaminthe, but also Elías Piña and Belladères; Jimani and 
Fonds Parisien; and Pedernales and Anses-à-Pitres.  
 
By transcending the limits of sovereign states, the two countries could define a new, 
holistic mapping of Hispaniola which could serve as a new paradigm of cooperation, 
interdependence, and collaboration between nations. Its articulation of insular counterpoints 
can legitimate and support initiatives for joint plans and projects for expanding commerce 
between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Muñoz, Maria Elena. Las Relationes Dominico-Haitianas: Geopolitica y Migracion. Santo Domingo: 
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III. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF AN EMU BETWEEN 
  THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI 
 
  During the past few decades, the economic performance of the Dominican Republican 
and Haiti has diverged markedly. As shown in Figure 1, using 1963 as a base year, by 2007 
real output in the Dominican Republic had increased almost ninefold (more than twice the 
increase in the United States during the same period), compared to quasi stagnation in Haiti. 
In per capita terms, real GDP tripled to about US$2,500 between 1960 and 2005 in the 
Dominican Republic, whereas it halved to US$430 in Haiti (Jaramillo and Sancak (2007)). 
This divergence in economic performance has put the two countries at the opposite ends of 
the spectrum in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
Figure 1 
Dominican Republic and Haiti: Real GDP Index, 1963–2007 
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      Source: World Bank. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
Editora Alfa & Omega, 1995.    8 
In the last three years, the governments of the Dominican Republic and Haiti have 
taken several steps to strengthen their commercial ties and set up a bilateral commission on 
trade.  Indeed, there appears to be greater recognition now on both sides of the benefits of 
regional economic integration.  
 
After defining the nature of an economic and monetary union (EMU), this section 
offers a brief overview of the potential benefits and costs that such a union could bring two 
countries that are geographically as close as the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The next 
section will examine the various economic criteria that have been proposed to assess whether 
these countries should form an EMU. 
 
1.  Nature of an Economic and Monetary Union 
 
An EMU between two countries can be defined as a single market with a common 
currency, managed by a single monetary authority. In turn, the adoption of a common 
currency is generally considered to be the final stage of a gradual process of economic 
integration, which typically involves the following stages: 
 
a) the elaboration of a preferential trading area (PTA),  which usually allows 
preferential access to select goods within the block via a reduction in tariffs, but not 
necessarily by abolishing them; 
 
b) a free trade area (FTA), which involves removing tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions for trading of most goods amongst members themselves, if production structures 
are largely complementary;  
 
c) a customs union, which involves the formation of a common trade area with a 
common external tariff policy (and possibly import quotas and a common competition 
policy);  
 
d) a common market, which is formed with the objective of removing barriers for the 
free movement of capital, goods, services and labor, while retaining a common external trade 
policy.   
 
Once a single market has adopted a common currency, it is termed an EMU.
3 Put 
differently, an EMU differs from a mere currency union because it involves a single market. 
The adoption of a single currency requires free movement of capital across member states, 
and the creation of an independent and supranational central bank responsible for 
implementing a common monetary policy. An EMU also involves harmonizing taxation and 
                                                 
3The final stage of economic integration, often referred to as “complete economic integration,” leads to 
a near complete harmonization of fiscal and monetary policies among members.  It also amounts to a loss of 
political independence of member nations as they are unable to use the monetary and fiscal policies 
independently.   9 
technical standards, with the objective of bringing in greater efficiency in resource allocation 
and enhancing competition.  
 
2.  Benefits and Costs of an Economic and Monetary Union 
 
The fundamental reason for creating an EMU is to bring in greater efficiency in 
resource allocation and enhanced competition. This is a particularly important consideration 
for the Dominican Republic and Haiti, given the small size of these economies taken 
individually. For instance, the formation of a PTA or an FTA could allow firms in the two 
countries to spread the costs of research and development over a larger market, thus reducing 
unit costs and encouraging greater innovation and technical progress. This could, in turn, 
generate positive spillovers as successful innovations are applied more broadly.  
 
Integration could boost productivity growth by allowing increased specialization, 
whereas increased competition could increase efficiency gains—possibly reinforced by 
foreign direct investment between the two countries. These benefits are further increased with 
a customs union and especially a common market (through the free movements of factors), 
although the use of a common external tariff policy may reduce scope for discretionary 
policy. 
 
At the same time, it is well recognized that PTAs and FTAs can entail some costs (see 
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996)). In particular, they may lead to trade creation, by replacing 
relatively high-cost domestic production with lower-cost imports from partner countries. They 
may also lead to trade diversion, which occurs when imports are switched from efficient 
nonmember suppliers to less efficient member countries benefiting from tariff preferences. 
Higher trade volumes between member countries that result from the agreement may also lead 
to greater, not smaller, losses to an individual member A who joins the agreement from a 
higher initial set of tariffs, because joining the agreement at a common lower tariff leads to a 
redistribution of tariff revenues from A to other member countries with initially lower tariffs. 
Nevertheless, it has been recognized that PTAs and FTAs are worth pursuing for countries 
whose ultimate goal is complete dismantling of barriers to labor and capital mobility, and 
complete economic integration with the formation of an EMU. 
 
The benefits and costs associated with the final stage of an EMU, the creation of a 
currency union, has been the focus of much debate. As discussed in more detail in Appendix 
A, the traditional literature has focused on the reduction in transactions costs and reduced 
exchange rate uncertainty as the main benefits of a monetary union. Such a union entails a 
reduction of transaction costs, a reduction in uncertainty about financial variables and 
macroeconomic policy, and promotes integration of both financial and goods markets. 
 
At the same time, however, the formation of an EMU has important implications for 
national economic policies. It entails the loss of the exchange rate as an adjustment 
mechanism to combat any deterioration in competitiveness.  Members are therefore deprived 
of one instrument to respond to shocks.  At the same time, monetary policy autonomy is   10
“surrendered” to the common Central Bank. Fiscal management and the degree of labor 
mobility become therefore key factors in the response to adverse shocks. 
 
 
IV. CRITERIA FOR AN EMU: PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The conditions under which two countries should form an EMU and reap the 
associated efficiency gains have led over the years to a number of broad economic criteria. 
For the last stage of an EMU, in particular, these criteria relate to whether these countries can 
or should form a Common Currency Area (CCA) or a currency union.
4 These criteria include 
the volatility of bilateral exchange rates, the similarity of inflation rates, the degree of 
correlation between economic shocks across countries, the degree of price and wage 
flexibility, the degree of labor mobility, and the scope for discretionary fiscal policy.
5  
 
In what follows we examine some of the these criteria especially the behavior of some 
of these variables in the context of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, especially inflation, 
business cycle synchronization, fiscal policy and public debt, exchange rates, and bilateral 
trade. Of course, the examination of historical data may provide a misleading indication of 
suitability of membership in a CCA, given that some of the criteria listed above are 
interrelated—or endogenous, as discussed later. Nevertheless, this discussion still provides 
valuable insights and will be complemented in the next section by a more formal analysis. 
 
1.  Volatility of Bilateral Exchange Rates 
 
It is now well recognized that exchange-rate volatility can be as harmful for 
intraregional trade (if not more) than tariff barriers. By blurring signals associated with 
relative price changes, exchange rate volatility (whether nominal or real) may hamper the 
ability of producers to reallocate resources production. Thus, the formation of a CCA can help 
to foster trade integration.
6 
                                                 
4The criteria are generally grouped under the header “theory of optimum currency areas” (or OCAs). 
Essentially, the theory of OCAs—first presented by Mundell (1961), in the context of the debate between fixed 
and flexible exchange rates of the 1960s. Note that a currency area is typically defined as a group of countries 
that undertake to fix their exchange rates, at least within narrow bands.  In contrast, a currency union is typically 
defined as an area where a single currency circulates.  The bilateral exchange rates are fixed and cannot be 
changed without a country quitting the union and reintroducing its own currency.  In practice, however, the 
difference between a currency union and a currency area is probably smaller than in principle, given that in both 
regimes capital mobility constrains monetary policy independence. 
5Ishiyama (1975) provides an early review of the literature. Subsequent discussions include Masson and 
Taylor (1992), Tavlas (1993), Mongelli (2002), and De Grauwe (2007). See Appendix A for a more detailed 
review of the costs and benefits of a monetary union. 
6As an example of this growing awareness, in January 2008 members of the East African Community 
(consisting of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, as well as Burundi and Rwanda since July 2007) announced their 
intention to bring forward, to 2012 from 2015, the formation of their planned monetary union, in an effort to 
   11
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the bilateral nominal exchange rate between the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti during the period January 1979-September 2007, using 
monthly data. It suggests that the exchange rate between the two countries has been quite 
volatile—especially after the countries switched to a flexible exchange rate (19- for the 
Dominican Republic and 19- for Haiti) and during periods of financial crisis.
7 Thus, the 
reduction in exchange rate volatility and transactions costs in foreign exchange that a CCA 
could bring would entail substantial benefits for the two countries. 
 
2.  Similarity of Inflation Rates 
 
The similarity of inflation rates (at levels consistent with overall macroeconomic 
stability) is one of the most common criteria used to evaluate the viability of a CCA. If 
inflation rates diverge too much between two potential members of a union, the ability to 
implement a common monetary policy (which follows from the adoption of a common 

























                                                                                                                                                         
bring about greater exchange rate stability among themselves and boost intraregional trade. 
7With higher frequency data (weekly or daily), the data would show even higher volatility during certain 
periods.   12
Figure 2 
Dominican Republic and Haiti: Bilateral Exchange Rate, 1979–2007 


































































































Source: International Monetary Fund. 
 
Figure 3 shows the behavior of annual inflation—measured in terms of the consumer 
price index—in the Dominican Republic and Haiti during the period 1963-2007, measured as 
deviations from US inflation.  The figure shows that inflation has displayed significant spikes 
and considerable volatility at times in both countries—for the Dominican Republic for 
instance, most recently following the financial crisis and sharp exchange rate depreciation in 
2003-04.  The correlation between the two series is also quite high at times. These results 
suggest that although both countries could gain from a CCA in terms of price stability, their 
medium- and long-term performance in that regard does not appear to have been sufficiently 
effective and comparable to envisage a rapid transition toward such an arrangement. 
 
At the same time, however, it is important to note that convergence in inflation does 
not need to be complete (in the sense of very narrow differentials among members) before 
adopting a CCA; as discussed later, the very process of union formation may bring about 
greater similarity in inflation between member countries—in part through greater integration 
in goods markets. 
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Figure 3 
Dominican Republic and Haiti: Consumer Price Inflation 
Deviations from US Inflation, 1964-2007 





















































     Source: World Bank. 
 
3.  Degree of Symmetry of Shocks 
 
As noted earlier, when a country joins a CCA or a currency union in the last stage of 
an EMU, the exchange rate becomes unavailable to act as a buffer when shocks hit the 
economy.  A key issue is therefore the extent to which the exchange rate is, to begin with, a 
“shock absorber.”  In general, the larger the degree of asymmetry of shocks across a potential 
currency union the greater the need to absorb shocks at the country level. Put differently, if 
the potential partners to a CCA have a common business cycle (in the sense that they tend to 
be affected by shocks in similar ways) rather than divergent business cycles, the costs of 
fixing the exchange rate across the union will be smaller. By contrast, if members of a 
currency union are often at different stages of the business cycle, then a common monetary   14




A reason why countries may face asymmetric (or idiosyncratic) shocks is that they 
have different commodity export baskets. The likelihood of asymmetric shocks tends to be 
smaller if a potential union partner is, to begin with, a key bilateral trading partner. This is 
because a boom in the union partner B will tend to increase demand for country A’s exports, 
while rising demand in country B will also tend to reduce their exports to country A. More 
generally, a high ratio of bilateral trade to total trade implies that the exchange rate is a 
relatively ineffective means of securing macroeconomic adjustment, so that foregoing its use 
(as required in a CCA) is relatively less costly. Put differently, if two countries trade a lot with 
each other, they are likely to benefit from low transaction costs and the elimination of 
exchange rate risk. Thus, the extent of bilateral trade is an important consideration in any 
assessment of the net benefits associated with a CCA. 
 
  To examine the degree of symmetry of shocks between the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti, a preliminary approach is therefore to look at the correlations of output gaps in the two 
countries, the extent of bilateral trade between them, and the behavior of their terms of trade. 
Figure 4 shows the behavior of the output gap in the two countries during the period 1963-
2007. The output gap is measured by the logarithm of the ratio of real GDP and its trend 
value, measured itself by the modified Baxter-King filter (see Christiano and Fitzgerald 
(2003)). The figure does not suggest much correlation between the output gap in the two 
countries; the actual correlation coefficient is only 0.03.  In fact, the correlation between 
output gaps in the Dominican Republic and the United States is in fact higher, reflecting a 











                                                 
8The idea that different regions within a currency union will sometimes be subject to shocks that cause 
their business cycles to diverge is hard to dispute; the key issue, however, is how often divergences occur and 
how significant they are. This is an empirical issue, which is discussed further later, in the context of Latin 
America and the Caribbean.   15
 
Figure 4 
Dominican Republic and Haiti: Output Gap, 1963–2007 














































     Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank data. See Appendix B for calculation method. 
 
 
The evolution of bilateral trade between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, using the 
IMF’s Directions of Trade statistics, suggests that measured trade between the two countries 
remains very low. There are a number of factors that may help to account for this. The first is 
that any assessment of the extent of trade between Haiti and DR faces a major problem—the 
coverage of the data. Frontiers between the two countries are highly permeable and informal 
trade is of great significance, being equivalent according to some estimates to as much as total 
recorded trade. Nevertheless, even allowing for such effects, the consensus remains that trade 
between the two countries accounts for only a small fraction of their total trade. 
 
One reason why this may be so is related to the non-complementary production 
structures of these economies, with exports consisting of goods and services (primary 
products, tourism in the case of the Dominican Republic) heavily in demand by the industrial 
countries, whereas imports consist mainly of raw materials and finished investment and 
consumer goods that are not produced domestically. Alternatively, the low level of trade may 
be explained by the relatively poor transportation and communications networks between the   16
two countries; these networks are mainly geared toward maintaining links with each country’s 
main partner, the United States, rather than between them. There are also historical reasons, as 
well as language and cultural barriers that may be relevant. 
 
However, while the level of trade between the two countries may be undoubtedly 
lower than one would expect based on their degree of proximity, from a normative standpoint 
it does not follow that it is somehow too low. Clearly, to make such a judgment requires an 
assessment of the optimal level of bilateral trade, based on the relevant structural and 
economic characteristics of the two countries. Although there are no formal studies focusing 
on this issue, standard trade models would suggest that in fact the level of trade between the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti is no lower than would be predicted given their structural 
characteristics. Indeed, it is probable that the low level of bilateral trade is well explained by 




Figure 5 shows the behavior over the past four decades of the terms of trade for the 
two countries.  Clearly, there does not appear to be any sizable degree of correlation between 
the behavior of these variables. This reflects to a large extent differences in the composition 















                                                 
9It should also be kept in mind that the overall degree of openness (as measured by total trade ratios) 
also matters from the perspective of a CCA. The reason is that the more open an economy, the more devaluation 
becomes a source of imported inflation; this may reduce significantly the benefits associated with an adjustment 
via currency changes because domestic inflation will then mitigate the initial effect of a nominal depreciation on 
the real exchange rate.   17
Figure 5 
Dominican Republic and Haiti: Terms of Trade Index (2000=100), 1963–2007 































    Source: IMF and World Bank. 
 
All three indicators suggest therefore that the Dominican Republic and Haiti are in 
general affected by asymmetric shocks. By itself, this would suggest that the formation of a 
CCA between these countries would not be advisable. However, before reaching this 
conclusion, there are two issues worth highlighting. First, in general two countries might 
exhibit low business cycle synchronicity not because using different currencies creates 
underlying structural asymmetries, but simply because the two monetary authorities are 
following different policies. Conversely, two countries might exhibit a relatively high level of 
synchronicity only because they are subject to common external shocks. What is needed 
therefore is to look at conditional business cycle correlations, instead of simple correlation 
coefficients; this is what is done in the next section. 
 
Second, the existence of asymmetric shocks (which are likely to remain, even in a well 
integrated union) is not sufficient to establish the case for retaining a separate currency. A 
CCA may still be viable in the presence of asymmetric shocks as long as there are alternative 
adjustment mechanisms available to deal with them.  These mechanisms include most notably 
the degree of wage and price flexibility, the degree of labor mobility, and the scope for 
discretionary fiscal policy—as discussed next.   18
 
4. Degree of Price and Wage Flexibility 
 
Adjustment to asymmetric shocks requires in general an adjustment of the real 
exchange rate.  If, as is the case in a currency union, the nominal exchange rate cannot adjust 
to cope with these shocks, a real exchange rate adjustment may come through movements in 
prices and wages. 
 
If wages are perfectly flexible, a reduction in nominal wages is essential similar to a 
nominal depreciation in its adjustment role. By contrast, when wages are rigid downward (as 
a result, for instance, of government interference through minimum wages, or the existence of 
trade unions), adjustment through wage reductions is much slower and more costly, to the 
extent that it may be accompanied by periods of high unemployment. Thus, a high degree of 
wage rigidity makes preserving nominal exchange rate flexibility and monetary independence 
more desirable. Price flexibility may also bring about an adjustment in the real exchange rate. 
However, in practice the degree of price flexibility is often limited. The slow response of 
prices to shocks may be caused by, for instance, price-setting behavior by firms and 
backward-looking expectations.  
 
More generally, it is often difficult in practice to judge whether a country has a 
sufficient degree of price and wage flexibility to facilitate smooth adjustment to idiosyncratic 
shocks.  In the case of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, there are few studies documenting 
directly the degree of flexibility. In the case of the Dominican Republic for instance, 
estimation results by Hernández (2008) suggest that there is some significant degree of 
nominal inertia in price setting. At the same time however, both countries have a sizable 
informal sector; According to estimates by Gasparini and Tornarolli (2007, Table 3.2) for 
instance, informal employment as a share of total employment represented 51.3 in the 
Dominican Republic in 2004, 82.1 percent in Haiti in 2001. This suggests a high degree of 
nominal wage flexibility, at least for unskilled workers.  
 
5. Degree of Labor Mobility 
 
When labor is mobile across union borders, asymmetric shocks to any individual 
member can in principle be absorbed through migration, without requiring relative price 
changes. Labor mobility may thus be particularly important in the presence of wage rigidities. 
For instance, if the real exchange rate does not adjust following a shift in relative demand 
across countries, unemployment may increase in the country where demand has been reduced; 
migration toward the other country where demand has increased may mitigate the problem.
10 
                                                 
10In the United States, labor mobility has been identified as the key regional adjustment mechanism for 
adjusting to regional unemployment, although migration does not seem to occur only in response to wage 
differentials.  In contrast, labor movements across Europe are very limited compared to those across United 
   19
 
In the case of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, there has always been quite a 
significant degree of labor mobility at the border—although mostly illegal. In addition, 
mobility has taken the form of mostly unskilled labor flows. However, beyond that mobility 
has been limited, to a large extent for cultural and historical reasons. There is also evidence 
that the formal labor market in these countries suffers from a number of imperfections and 
distortions—including labor regulations that raise the cost of hiring and firing workers (see 
Inter-American Development Bank (2003)). Thee are also challenges related to youth 
unemployment, the mismatch between the educational system and the needs of the labor 
market, the creation of jobs, low levels of productivity coupled with relatively high wages, 
and sustained emigration flows of skilled labor from the region. This “brain drain” has helped 
to strengthen the economic links between each country and the United States.  In addition, 
language is likely to remain a persistent barrier between the two countries. Labor mobility is 
therefore unlikely to provide much scope for absorbing shocks, thereby making wage 
flexibility and fiscal policy all the more important. 
 
6.  Scope for Discretionary Fiscal Policy 
 
As noted earlier, countries participating in a CCA must give up the use of monetary 
policy and the exchange rate. But when a country is subjected to an asymmetric shock, 
automatic fiscal stabilizers “kick in” and may ease the burden. In addition, discretionary fiscal 
policy (involving borrowing or lending) within nations could be as effective as centralized 
institutions in cushioning external shocks.  
 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the overall fiscal balance in the Dominican Republic 
and Haiti over the period 1960-2007. The figure suggests that neither one of these countries 
has managed to maintain surpluses for long; on the contrary, both countries have experienced 
persistent periods of high deficits, which have fueled the accumulation of public debt. This 
discrepancy between fiscal outcomes makes it difficult to envisage a CCA between the two 
countries; limits are typically built in CCAs on debt levels and deficits. For instance, the 
Maastricht Treaty criteria required a 3 percent maximum fiscal deficit and a ratio of public 
debt to GDP inferior to 60 percent. 
 
There are also divergent domestic medium-term considerations that may guide fiscal 
policy in both countries, such as the need to engage in fiscal consolidation in order to reduce 
constraints on the financing of private investment, or the need to satisfy qualitative criteria, 
such as improving tax collection (a key issue in both countries) and/or implementing a better 
arbitrage between current and investment expenditure. These considerations may severely 
reduce the scope for discretionary policy actions in response to shocks. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         




Dominican Republic and Haiti: Overall Fiscal Balance (percent of GDP), 1960-2007 
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    Source: IMF. 
 
The foregoing discussion provides only mixed evidence (at best) in support of a CCA 
between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. However, it must be kept in mind, as noted 
earlier, that simple (unconditional) correlations can be misleading for assessing the degree of 
comovements between variables. In the short run, unconditional correlation coefficients can 
vary in response to a wide variety of macroeconomic factors. The analysis performed in the 
next section (which introduces a number of control variables in a multivariate framework) 
provides more accurate measures of business cycle synchronicity. More importantly, the 
criteria used may be endogenous, as a result of the very existence, and induced effects, of a 
CCA.  For instance, it has been argued that similarity of inflation rates may be promoted by 
participating in a currency union. Hoffman and Remsperger (2005) for instance have found 
that, for the Euro area, the degree of persistence in inflation differentials fell significantly 
following the adoption of the common currency in 1999. Similarly, once two countries choose 
to form a CCA, their business cycle may become more synchronized, as the elimination of 
currency fluctuations may spur trade between them. There is also evidence suggesting that the   21
formation of a monetary union may foster macroeconomic integration.
11 We will return to this 
issue in the concluding section of the paper. 
 
 
V.  DEGREE OF SYMMETRY OF SHOCKS: A VARX ANALYSIS 
 
The foregoing discussion has provided a conceptual and preliminary statistical 
analysis of the various criteria that may be relevant in considering whether the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti could form an EMU. We now turn to a more formal analysis, based on 
vector autoregression (VAR) models, with a focus on understanding how the two countries 
respond to external and domestic shocks. We begin with ha description of the VARX 
methodology. We then present and analyze two VARX models, which differ by their degree 
of complexity. 
 
1.  VAR and VARX Methodology 
       
 
In general, a standard linear VAR model can be written in the structural form
12 
                                  




is a vector of n endogenous variables; 
 
is a vector of p exogenous variables (the first of which is a 
constant term); 
                                                 
11See Fielding and Shields (2005) for the CFA franc Zone and Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, and Martínez-
Serrano (2008) for the Euro Zone.   22
 
is a vector of n random shocks that are uncorrelated over time 
and mutually uncorrelated, with a (diagonal) variance matrix . 
 
To simplify, we will assume that all variables in this system are stationary, and that the 
exogenous variables only enter contemporaneously (that is, they are dated at period t).  The 
elements of matrix A, of order n×n (respectively C, of order n×p) are the structural parameters 
related to endogenous variables (respectively, exogenous) and B(L) is a matrix polynomial 
which depends on the lag operator L, defined so that L
kzt = zt-k, that is 
 
                                 
  
where m+1 is the number of lags and the matrices Bi are of order n×n. Matrix A captures 
instantaneous causality links (or, more generally, contemporaneous interactions) between 
endogenous variables. 
 
  A reduced form of the above system is given by 
 




                             
             
  The matrices D, of order n×n, and E, of order n×p, are nonlinear functions of the 
structural parameters on the contemporaneous endogenous variables, A, and the 
contemporaneous response of endogenous variables to the exogenous variables, C.  Let  
denote the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form shocks t; exact identification of 
the parameters of the structural form equations from the estimated parameters of the reduced-
                                                                                                                                                         
12See for instance Lütkepohl (2006) for a detailed presentation of standard VAR models and their 
properties.   23
form equation requires that the number of “free” parameters in A and  be equal to the 
number of independent parameters in . It can be shown that, if the diagonal elements of A 
are normalized to unity, n(n-1)/2 restrictions on the coefficients of A are needed to achieve 
exact identification (see for instance Lütkepohl (2006)). 
 
Consider for instance the case where n = 3, p = 2, and m = 0; the reduced-form VAR is 





If there are no restrictions on the coefficients dij and eij in matrices D and E, we must 
estimate 3
2 + 3×2 = 15 parameters. The problem this number rises rapidly with the number of 
variables and the number of lags, thereby leading quickly to problems of degrees of freedom 
and eventually preventing estimation. For instance, with two lags on all endogenous variables 
(m = 1), 24 parameters should be estimated, and with 3 lags, 33 parameters. Thus, even a 
parsimonious VAR may quickly exhaust the number of degrees of freedom available in a 
typical time-series application. 
     
A VARX model is an attempt to alleviate this problem. It involves imposing 
restrictions on the interactions, static and dynamic, between variables in a VAR, on the basis 
of a priori economic reasoning. Suppose that the model builder “knows” that variables y1t and 
y2t can interact between themselves (as well as possibly with other variables), but that they do 
not have any effect on variable y3t, which is itself determined only by its past values (here, the 
one-period lag), without a constant term. There is therefore an asymmetry between the 
model's endogenous variables; causality is unidirectional. 
 
A VARX system allows the modeler to exploit this asymmetry (or ex ante 
information) in order to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, compared to a 
standard VAR; the resulting increase in the number of degrees of freedom may not only make 
estimation feasible, but it will also lead to improved efficiency of those parameters that are 
estimated.  
 
In the example being considered, the reduced form can now be written as 




The system becomes therefore recursive; the four restrictions that have been imposed 
(d31 = d32 = 0, and e31 = e32 = 0) imply that only 3²-2+2×2 = 11 parameters must be estimated, 
instead of 15 with the standard VAR. The gain in terms of degrees of freedom is thus quite 
significant. 
 
Equally important, the VARX specification allows the modeler to calculate impulse 
response functions associated with innovations on those variables that are “partially” 
endogenous, such as y3t here. By treating y3t as a purely exogenous variable (such as those 
included in the vector Xt), such calculations would not be feasible. A similar argument holds 
for variance decompositions. 
 
In general, restrictions imposed on the structural form are not always sufficient to 
guarantee that all structural parameters are identified. Thus, a VARX model is not 
synonymous to a structural VAR, which requires a specific number of exclusion restrictions 
(including those associated with the normalization of the system) to achieve exact 
identification, as discussed earlier. At the same time, the exclusion restrictions typically 
imposed in a VARX (that domestic variables do not affect foreign variables, for instance) are 
often used in structural VAR models, given their plausibility.
13 
 
Structural VARs have been used by a number of authors to discuss convergence issues 
in CCAs; among developing countries, these studies (which are based on the Blanchard-Quah 
technique or some variant of it) include Ahumada and Martinera (2001), Fielding and Shields 
(2001, 2005), Buigut and Valev (2005), and Saxena (2005), and Allegret and Sanc-Zantman 
(2009).
14 A common criticism of structural VARs, however, is that the restrictions used are 
quite arbitrary. In this case, applying the Blanchard-Quah technique is particularly 
problematic: it assumes that aggregate demand shocks have a temporary impact on output, 
                                                 
13Note that, in the formulation (4), restrictions are imposed directly on the reduced form; equivalently, 
they could be imposed on the structural form. In the present example, matrices A and B0 (given that m = 0) 
would become, using the normalization aii = 1, 
 
                 
14As an alternative approach, Houssa (2008) uses dynamic factor models.   25
whereas aggregate supply shocks are have a permanent effect. But casual observation 
suggests that many of the shocks that affect the two countries here are temporary supply 
disturbances, related for instance to climatic shocks (hurricanes, etc.) or terms-of-trade 
shocks. We therefore do not attempt to identify the characteristics of structural shocks to these 
economies and focus instead on a reduced-form VARX approach. 
 
2.  A Basic VARX Model 
 
We consider first a basic VARX model consisting of five variables, which were 
defined in the previous section: output gaps in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, with trend 
values measured by the modified Baxter-King filter; inflation rates (measured as deviations 
from US inflation) in the two countries; and the US output gap, which is not only an indicator 
of activity abroad and demand for domestic exports for both countries, but also an indicator of 
capital flows associated with remittances from nationals abroad; indeed both countries have 
sizable diaspora outside the national territory and benefit from sizable unrequited transfers. 
By using an integrated model instead of separate models, we are able to analyze directly how 
domestic variables in each country respond to shocks to variables in the other country, while 
at the same time accounting for possible interactions between variables in both countries 
induced by external shocks (in this case, shocks to the US output gap). 
 
All five variables are stationary at a standard significance level of 5 percent, as 
documented by the unit root tests reported in Appendix B. Thus, we can exclude any 
cointegration relationship between them and, instead of a VECM, we can proceed but a VAR 
in levels. The first four variables are considered fully interactive in the model (in the sense 
that the associated parameters are not subject to restrictions), whereas the US output gap is 
treated as a partially interactive endogenous variable, which is subject to restrictions on its 
instantaneous causality and interdependence links. The constant term is the only strictly 
exogenous variable. 
 
Suppose that the five variables defined earlier are numbered according to the order in 
which they were presented, that is, variables 1 to 4 are the fully interactive variables (y1t and 
y2t being the output gaps in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and y3t and y4t inflation rates 
in both countries) and 5 is the partially interactive variable (the US output gap).  It is totally 
plausible to assume that output fluctuations in the U.S. affects output gaps and inflation in the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti, but it is unlikely that activity and inflation in these two 
countries have much effect on fluctuations in U.S. output. This variable is taken to depend 
solely on its past value(s). 
 
The strictly exogenous variable (the constant term) is numbered 1. In addition, 
suppose that the model considers uniformly only one lag, so that m = 0. In matrix form, the 
VARX model can then be written as 





,   ,  
 




We can infer from this system that the gain in terms of degrees of freedom associated 
with the VARX relative to a standard VAR with no restrictions of any sort is given by 
5*(5+1) – 4*(4+1+1) - 1*(1+1) = 4. If, instead, the model has uniformly two lags, so that m = 
1, the gain is 5*(10+1) – 4*(10+1) - 1*(2+1) = 8. 
 
  The variance decompositions obtained with two lags are shown in Table 1, using the 
Cholesky ordering: the US output gap, the output gap in the Dominican Republic, the output 
gap in Haiti, inflation deviation for the Dominican Republic, and the inflation deviation for 
Haiti. We therefore take the US output gap to be the most “exogenous” variable, followed by 
the variables for the Dominican Republic (the bigger of the two island countries), and last the 
two variables for Haiti.
15 In the context of our analysis, variance decomposition tells us the 
extent to which variability in real output and inflation in each of the two countries is 
influenced by shocks to common factors—in this basic case, shocks to US output. This is 
important because differences in the cause of variability in the countries could be indicative of 
underlying differences in the transmission mechanism and the policy strategies in both 





                                                 
15The order in which the variables for the Dominican Republic and Haiti was also inverted, to check for 
robustness; this did not affect significantly the results.   27
Table 1 
Basic VARX Model: Variance Decompositions 
Variance Decomposition of GAP_HT_BK: 
                    
 
Period  S.E. GAP_HT_BK GAP_DR_BK  DLINFL_DUS_HT  DLINFL_DUS_DR GAP_US_BK 
                    
1 0.024  100.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2 0.025  96.484  1.521  1.080  0.647  0.269 
3 0.028  79.095  3.499  11.022  4.016  2.368 
4 0.028  75.700  3.612  13.209  5.020  2.459 
5 0.029  72.533  3.580  15.659  5.053  3.174 
6 0.029  71.021  3.491  16.930  4.952  3.606 
7 0.030  70.694  3.479  17.256  4.982  3.589 
8 0.030  70.446  3.471  17.374  5.033  3.676 
9 0.030  70.300  3.469  17.487  5.039  3.704 
10 0.030  70.224  3.470  17.569  5.037  3.700 
            
 Variance Decomposition of GAP_DR_BK: 
            
1 0.025  0.000  100.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2 0.028  3.934  94.649  0.038  0.371  1.008 
3 0.028  3.792  92.035  0.969  2.156  1.048 
4 0.030  3.791  87.786  3.772  2.196  2.454 
5 0.031  3.778  85.400  4.859  2.128  3.835 
6 0.031  3.840  85.031  5.106  2.186  3.837 
7 0.031  3.823  84.319  5.089  2.157  4.612 
8 0.031  3.816  84.070  5.080  2.280  4.754 
9 0.031  3.833  83.818  5.064  2.407  4.878 
10 0.031  3.825  83.579  5.061  2.413  5.121 
            
 Variance Decomposition of DLINFL_DUS_HT: 
            
1 0.083  0.697  4.207  95.097  0.000  0.000 
2 0.095  1.214  5.121  93.185  0.416  0.064 
3 0.107  2.522  5.431  91.126  0.586  0.334 
4 0.112  2.796  5.514  90.544  0.697  0.449 
5 0.115  2.886  5.341  90.431  0.911  0.431 
6 0.116  2.887  5.240  90.232  1.200  0.441 
7 0.117  2.858  5.213  89.971  1.517  0.441 
8 0.117  2.837  5.238  89.691  1.728  0.505 
9 0.117  2.826  5.255  89.545  1.816  0.558 
10 0.117  2.823  5.255  89.509  1.850  0.564 
            
 Variance Decomposition of DLINFL_DUS_DR: 
            
1 0.100  0.108  5.524  5.732  88.637  0.000 
2 0.119  0.573  5.704  6.318  87.265  0.140 
3 0.138  2.218  11.025  4.735  79.468  2.553 
4 0.145  2.376  11.664  4.266  75.545  6.149   28
5 0.146  2.470  11.492  4.210  74.999  6.828 
6 0.147  2.481  11.591  4.243  74.776  6.909 
7 0.147  2.479  11.560  4.278  74.575  7.108 
8 0.147  2.518  11.550  4.315  74.520  7.096 
9 0.148  2.549  11.556  4.325  74.306  7.265 
10 0.148  2.550  11.551  4.327  74.253  7.319 
                    
Source: Author’s calculations 
     Notes: GAP_DR_BK is the output gap for the Dominican Republic, GAP_HT_BK the output gap for Haiti, 
DLINFL_DUS_DR the inflation differential with respect to the US for the Dominican Republic, 
DLINFL_DUS_HT the inflation differential with respect to the US for Haiti, and GAP_US_BK the output gap 
for the United States. The Choleski ordering of the variables is as described in the text. 
 
  The results indicate that at a horizon of 10 periods, fluctuations in the output gap in the 
Dominican Republic are explained mostly by its own innovations (more than 80 percent). 
This is less so for Haiti, with own innovations accounting for about 70 percent, and 
innovations in domestic inflation accounting for about 21 percent of output gap fluctuations. 
In both countries fluctuations in inflation are accounted for mostly by their own innovations 
(about 80 percent), with a somewhat more significant effect of the domestic output gap in the 
case of the Dominican Republic. In neither case does the US output gap play a significant role 
in domestic fluctuations. There are also no significant cross-country effect between the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti. This could reflect the fact that economic fluctuations in both 
countries are subject to large temporary supply shocks; although these shocks can be 
correlated (as is the case with hurricanes), this is not always the case. 
 
We examine next the impulse response function to an innovation in the US output gap 
and the response functions of domestic variables in response to shocks in the other country. 
The objective is to examine if and how each country’s domestic macroeconomic variables 
respond to the same external shock, and if and how they respond to shocks in the other 
country. To the extent that both countries respond in a similar way to the first shock (that is, 
by displaying a high degree of symmetry), are better potential candidates for a CCA. 
Moreover, the speed of response matters also; in general, the slower is the adjustment after 
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Figure 7 
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Response of DLINFL_DUS_HT to GAP_US_BK
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Source : Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 7 shows the response of domestic variables in the two countries to an 
innovation in all the variables at a horizon of 10 periods and using the ordering described 
earlier. The solid lines (in blue) in the figures represent the impulse responses themselves, 
whereas the dotted lines (in red) are the associated 95 percent upper and lower confidence 
bands.
16 The results suggest that domestic variables do not respond significantly to shocks to 
the US output gap. In addition, domestic variables in one country do not respond either to 
shocks to domestic variables in the other countries. Thus, these results appear to corroborate 
the preliminary analysis, based on unconditional correlations, which suggested limited 
business cycle synchronization between the two countries. At the same time, however, it is 
possible that the small number of variables included in the VARX does not allow one to 
properly capture the transmission process of these shocks. To investigate further this potential 
misspecification problem, we now turn to a more extended model. 
                                                 
16The impulse responses and their associated confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo 
simulations employing 1,000 draws. Eviews 3.1 was used to perform all computations.   30
 
3.  An Extended VARX Model 
 
We now extend the basic VARX model to consider, in addition to the five variables 
above (the output gaps and inflation deviations in the two countries, and the US output gap), 
the following variables: 
 
a) the ratio of credit to GDP in the two countries; 
 




c) the rate of change of the price of oil in US dollars;  
 
d) the real US Treasury bill rate, given by the nominal rate deflated by the US inflation 
rate in consumer prices.  
 
Given what is known about the importance of banks in financing domestic activity in 
developing countries (see for instance Agénor and Montiel (2008)), one would expect the 
ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP to play an important role in the transmission of a 
variety of shocks to output and inflation in the two countries: it can be viewed as measuring 
the availability of loanable funds, and thus possibly a constraining factor on economic 
activity. As shown in Figure 8, these ratios have fluctuated significantly during the sample 
period. Similarly, the real exchange rate, being a key relative price, is also expected to play an 
important role in the transmission mechanism of both domestic and international shocks. The 













                                                 
17We constructed a bilateral real exchange rate index because standard measures, such as the IMF’s real 
effective exchange rate, were not available for the whole sample period. Details of our calculations are provided 
in Appendix B. 
18In estimating the model, we introduced two dummy variables, taking the value 1 in 1985 and 2003 for 
the Dominican Republic, and 1992 for Haiti, to account for the financial crises (and large nominal depreciations) 
that were recorded in both countries during these periods. These “spikes” can be clearly identified in Figure 9.   31
Figure 8 
Dominican Republic and Haiti: Credit to the Private Sector, 1963-2007 
___ Dominican Republic _ _ _ Haiti 
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Figure 9 
Dominican Republic and Haiti: Bilateral Real Exchange Rates, 1963-2007 
___ Dominican Republic _ _ _ Haiti 

























      Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF data (see Appendix B). 
 
Given that the Dominican Republic and Haiti are both oil importers, accounting for 
changes in the price of oil, and studying its potential impact on both countries, is also 
important. In the absence of sufficiently long time-series on the domestic-currency retail price 
for each country (which would have the advantage of taking into account changes in subsidies 
and taxes), we use a common price index in foreign prices.
19 While the US output gap 
captures (as before) “trade” and “remittance” channels, the US interest rate captures a 
“financial” channel, that is, a measure of borrowing conditions on world capital markets. This 
is more appropriate for the Dominican Republic (given its ability to borrow on world capital 
markets in normal times) as opposed to Haiti, which cannot borrow on these markets.
20  
 
                                                 
19See Appendix B for an exact definition of the index.  
20Ideally, what would be more appropriate to measure financial shocks for the Dominican Republic 
would be a country-specific measure of borrowing costs on world capital markets, which would account for the 
country-specific spread above and over the risk-free US Treasury rate. Unfortunately, such a variable is not 
available for the whole period under study.   33
As shown in Appendix B, all of these new variables are also stationary at a 
significance level of 5 percent, except for the US real interest rate, which is significant at a 10 
percent significance level; we therefore specify again the VARX in levels.  For convenience, 
we rename the US output gap variable as y11t. The degree of endogeneity of the new variables, 
numbered now 5 to 10, is as follows. Variables y5t and y6t, the real exchange rates in Haiti and 
the Dominican Republic, respectively, are taken to be fully interactive, just like the output 
gaps and inflation rates.   
 
All the other variables are taken to be partially interactive. Variables y7t and y8t,, the 
private sector credit variables in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, respectively, are taken to 
affect directly only the output gap in the respective country; they have no direct effect on the 
other fully interactive variables, inflation and the real exchange rates. In addition, these 
variables are also taken to depend only on their own lagged value and the lagged output gap, 
to capture possible bidirectional causality between credit and economic activity. Variable y9t, 
the rate of change of the price of oil, depends only on its past value; it can affect all domestic 
variables in the fully interactive block. Variable y10t, the US real interest rate, is assumed to 
depend not only on its past value but also depend on lagged value of the US output gap, which 
is now y11t. Conversely, the US output gap is also assumed to depend now not only on its 
lagged value but also on the lagged value(s) of the real US interest rate and oil prices. Thus, 
the model now accounts for interactions between the US variables themselves, and between 
oil prices and US activity—while maintaining the unidirectional causality between US 
variables and domestic variables in Haiti and the Dominican Republic (y10t and y11t can affect 
all domestic variables). Just as before, all of the partially endogenous variables can affect the 
fully interactive variables. 
 
Given the increase in the number of variables, to preserve degrees of freedom, the 
number of lags is restricted uniformly to 1 (m = 0). In matrix form, the extended VARX 
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and the submatrices dij, based on the restrictions defined earlier, are given by
21 
 
                                                               
              
 
                  
                                                 
21The dependence of the credit-to-GDP ratio on the (lagged) output gap in the respective country, as 
noted earlier, explains why the submatrix d21 does not contain only zeroes but instead is specified as having d71  
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and 
 
           
 
Based on these matrices, we can calculate as before the gain in terms of degrees of 
freedom that the extended VARX model provides, relative to a standard VAR model with no 
restrictions of any sort. From the above matrices, this gain is now given by 11*(11+1) – (6*6 
+ 20 + 2 + 8) = 121 – 66 = 55.
22 
 
The variance decompositions are shown in Table 2, using the following Cholesky 
ordering: the world price of oil, the US real interest rate, the US output gap, the credit 
variables in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, the output gap in the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti, inflation deviation for the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and the real exchange rates in 
the two countries. We therefore take the world price of oil as the most “exogenous” variable, 
followed by the US variables; the rest of the ordering is as for the basic VARX model.
23  
 
For the purpose at hand, the important issue is the extent to which variability in the 
“core” macro variables (real output, inflation, and the real exchange rate) in each of the two 
countries is influenced by shocks to common external factors—captured now by shocks to 
two US variables and world oil prices.  
 
  The results indicate that at a horizon of 10 periods, own innovations play a much less 
significant role for output gaps and inflation rates—in contrast to the results obtained with the 
                                                                                                                                                         
0 and d82  0. 
22In an unpublished Appendix (Appendix C, available upon request), we also estimated an alternative 
extended VARX model, in which the real exchange rate variables were treated only as partially interactive. 
Although the gain in terms of degrees of freedom implied by the additional restrictions proved substantial (equal 
to 121 – 46 = 75, with only 46 parameters to estimate, instead of 66), the results obtained were very similar to 
those reported here. 
23Again, the order in which the variables for the Dominican Republic and Haiti was inverted to check 
for robustness, but this did not have a significant impact on the results.   36
basic VARX model. For the output gap, the share of all three variables is about 7 percent for 
the Dominican Republic and 10 percent for Haiti. For inflation, the shares are 12 percent and 
10 percent, respectively, and for the real exchange rate 7 percent and 8 percent, respectively. 
Innovations in credit ratios play a significant role (compared to the real exchange rate) in 
explaining fluctuations in the output gap in both countries; at the same time, innovations in 
output gaps and inflation rates have a sizable effect on fluctuations in the real exchange rate in 
both countries. Country effects are a bit more significant as well. Nevertheless, fluctuations in 
the external factors account for a relatively small share of the fluctuations in the domestic 
variables.  Thus, the extended VARX model show some significant differences in differences 
in the cause of variability in the countries could be indicative of underlying differences in the 
transmission mechanism and the policy strategies in both countries, which could be an 
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Table 2 
Extended VARX Model: Variance Decompositions 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: OIL is the rate of change of the world price of oil, RATE_US is the real US Treasury rate, 
CRED_DR (CRED_HT) is the ratio of private sector credit to GDP in the Dominican Republic (Haiti), and 
RER_DR (RER_HT) is the real exchange rate for the Dominican Republic (Haiti). For the other variables, see 
the note to Table 1. The Choleski ordering of the variables is as described in the text. 
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We examine next the impulse response functions associated with both domestic and 
external shocks. These functions, which are constructed as described earlier, are shown in 
Figures 10 to 16. For clarity, we report only those related to the output gap, inflation, and the 
real exchange rate in both countries. 
 
Without getting into all the details of these results, some broad features can be 
identified. In general, and contrary to what one would have expected for some of them (e.g., a 
shock to the US output gap, given the importance of the United States as a trade partner and a 
source of remittances for both countries), external shocks do not have large effects on 
domestic variables—as can be inferred from an examination of Figures 10 to 12. For instance, 
in Figure 10, which illustrates the impact of an oil price shock, the only significant responses 
are a slight increase in the inflation differential (on impact in the Dominican Republic, in the 
second period in Haiti), and an initial real appreciation in the Dominican Republic; the 
response of the other variables are not statistically significant, and therefore not much can be 
inferred from their pattern.  
 
By contrast, for domestic shocks, responses vary depending on the shock. A positive 
shock to the output gap in the Dominican Republic has no statistically significant effects on 
other domestic variables or variables in Haiti (see Figure 13), whereas a positive shock to the 
output gap in Haiti generates a small increase in the rate of real depreciation (brought about 
by a nominal exchange rate depreciation, given that the inflation differential for the country 
does not drop by much) and no effect on variables in the Dominican Republic (see Figure 14). 
More interestingly, although a positive shock to the inflation differential for Haiti affects only 
the country’s real exchange rate (it leads to a significant and sustained real appreciation, as 
could be expected, see Figure 16) and no foreign variables, a positive shock to the inflation 
differential for the Dominican Republic leads not only to a higher rate of inflation 
domestically but also to higher inflation in Haiti (see Figure 15). Although the impact on 
inflation in Haiti is less persistent (two years instead of three for the Dominican Republic) it is 
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Figure 10 
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Figure 11 
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Figure 12 
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Figure 13 
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Figure 14 
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Figure 15 
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Figure 16 
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VI. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The purpose of this paper was to offer a preliminary assessment of the potential 
benefits and costs of an economic and monetary union (EMU) between the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti—two countries sharing the same island but whose history is one of 
conflict and divergent economic prospects in recent decades. After a brief review of the 
historical context, it examined the nature of these potential benefits and costs. It then 
conducted a preliminary analysis (using basic statistical techniques) of some key 
criteria for the formation of an EMU between the two countries.  
 
The third part conducted a more formal analysis of business cycle synchronization, based on 
integrated (two-country) VARX models as opposed to standard VARs, to economize on 
degrees of freedom and permit estimation using annual time series. The goal of the analysis 
was to examine if and how each country’s domestic macroeconomic variables respond to the 
same external shock, and if and how they respond to shocks in the other country. To the 
extent that both countries respond in a similar way to external shocks (that is, by displaying a 
high degree of symmetry), they are better potential candidates for a CCA. Moreover, the 
speed of response matters also; in general, the slower is the adjustment after disturbances, the 
larger will be the cost of maintaining a single currency. A basic VARX model (involving only 
inflation rate differentials in the two countries relative to US inflation, and output gaps, with 
the US output as the common external shock) and an extended model (involving, in addition 
to the previous variables, the world oil price, the US real interest rate, bilateral real exchange 
rates, and private sector credit-to-GDP ratios) were formulated, with explicit and plausible 
restrictions on the degree of interactions between these variables, and estimated using 
standard techniques. In general, impulse response functions indicated that innovations in 
external variables do not seem to generate clear and common patterns in domestic variables, 
thereby suggesting limited business cycle synchronization between the two countries in 
response to the occurrence of common external shocks. This is also the case for domestic 
shocks—there appear to be limited “spillovers effects” from one country to another—except 
for positive shocks to inflation in the Dominican Republic, which appear to translate quickly 
into inflation in Haiti.  
 
Overall, both the preliminary analysis and the more formal VARX models suggest that 
at this stage several economic criteria are not satisfied for the two countries to fully benefit 
from an EMU.  For instance, the lack of similarity in the response and adjustment process to 
shocks, both external and domestic, may reflect very different policy responses between the 
two countries; indeed, if shocks are not immediately offset by a policy response, then their 
effect will vary substantially between the two countries, with no obvious common policy 
response appropriate to both of them. In turn, this suggests potentially severe coordination 
problems.  
   47
At the same time, however, it is important to keep in mind that most of the criteria for 
forming an EMU (including the degree of business cycle synchronization) are endogenous 
and may change in response to an explicit and credible commitment to move toward greater 
integration. This militates in favor of an aggressive medium-term agenda for integration and 
partnership between the two countries—provided that the political will to do so goes beyond 
the recent rhetoric. Indeed, although the focus of this paper has been on the economic criteria 
for the formation of an EMU, the lesson of history is that the political commitment toward 
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Appendix A 
Benefits and Costs Associated with a Currency Union 
 
Currency unions entail various benefits and costs. The traditional literature has 
focused on the reduction in transactions costs and reduced exchange rate uncertainty as the 
main benefits of monetary union, whereas more recent work has emphasized potential gains 
in terms of financial integration and credibility. One of the key disadvantages is the loss of 
monetary independence—because it deprives members of the ability to alter the nominal 
exchange rate of their currency in response to a shock. This Appendix provides a more 
detailed overview of these benefits and costs. 
 
A.1 Benefits Associated with Currency Unions 
 
A.1.1 Reduced Transactions Costs 
 
A common and immediate benefit from currency union is the elimination of 
transactions costs; there is no longer a need to convert currencies when trading with other 
countries within the union.  These benefits can be particularly large for members for which 
weaker financial markets and technology makes transacting in foreign currencies more costly, 
and trade is denominated mostly in foreign currencies (as is the case for most developing 
countries).  If, in addition to currency conversion, trade with the rest of the world involves 
additional financial costs (in the form, for instance, of letters of credit), a currency union may 
generate cost savings in those areas as well. 
 
A.1.2 Reduced Exchange Rate Uncertainty 
 
An immediate benefit of a common currency is a reduction in exchange rate risk (that 
is, the uncertainty associated with exchange rate movements) involved in trade and financial 
transactions between countries.  For instance, a contract in the seller’s currency can leave 
buyers uncertain as to the amount (in their own currency) that they will actually have to pay 
upon delivery.  While there are ways to hedge against this risk (by using forward contracts 
and options, for instance), doing so may be costly or impossible, especially when a 
developing country currency is involved.
24  Moreover, if a currency union reduces exchange 
rate variability relative to union partners, and leads to a decrease in the risk premium built into 
domestic interest rates, it may stimulate investment, by making attractive “marginal” projects 
that are not currently undertaken due to the relatively high cost of capital; there is therefore an 
“investment creation” effect, as discussed by Agénor and Aizenman (2008).  Thus, the larger 
the trade and financial flows between member countries, the greater the gain from a reduction 
in exchange rate volatility.
25 
                                                 
24For instance, contracts that would allow domestic borrowers to hedge foreign currency-denominated 
obligations into domestic currency obligations may not be readily available for a sufficiently long horizon, 
corresponding to the term of the transaction. 
25An adverse effect of exchange rate volatility on trade in developing countries may be due to the fact 
that, in these countries, hedging markets do not exist, or may be very illiquid. Parsley and Popper (2006) for 
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However, the evidence about the effects of exchange rate variability on exports, 
capital flows, and investment is largely inconclusive, suggesting that the magnitude of saving 
may not be very high.  For instance, using a broad sample of eighty seven countries (both 
industrial and developing) from 1970 to 1997, and after accounting for various sources of 
bias, Tenreyro (2007) found that exchange-rate variability had no significant impact on trade.  
This finding suggests that the availability of forward contracts, currency options, and other 
alternatives for risk diversification and management may provide sufficient hedging to reduce 
the potential drawbacks of exchange-rate variability on trade.  From that perspective alone, 
then, the benefit of a currency union may be mitigated. At the same time, however, there is 
other evidence suggesting that confirms that exchange rate volatility may still be an important 
discouraging factor when it comes to trade flows involving developing countries among 
themselves, or between themselves and developed countries (see for instance Inter-American 
Development Bank (2006)). In such conditions, the gains highlighted above would remain 
quite substantial. 
 
A.1.3 Increased Financial Integration 
  
A currency union may (all else equal) improve welfare of all members by increasing 
financial diversification in two ways.  First, by reducing currency risk, as noted earlier, it 
allows national financial intermediaries to seek greater exposure on their liability side.   
Second, it offers greater scope to these intermediaries to diversify their lending portfolios 
across member countries. From the perspective of individuals, a single currency area may also 
offer risk-sharing benefits when domestic capital markets are limited in their ability to 
facilitate consumption insurance (Ching and Devereux (2003)). As discussed later, however, 
to the extent that credit market imperfections continue to persist after the formation of the 
union (because of difficulties of harmonizing bankruptcy legislation among members with 
very different legal systems to begin with, for instance), these gains may be slow to 
materialize. 
 
A.1.4 Improved Credibility 
  
Joining a currency union provides a credible constraint for a country wishing to “tie its 
hands” and prevent discretionary changes in short-run monetary policy that are inconsistent 
with the long-run objective of low and stable inflation (Guillaume and David Stasavage 
(1999)).  The decision to surrender the power to alter the exchange rate and manipulate 
interest rates is indeed a possible way to signal a country’s commitment to low inflation and 
influence inflation expectations.
26  In a sense, membership in a monetary union plays a role 
                                                                                                                                                         
instance found that Asia-Pacific firms remain significantly exposed to fluctuations in major currencies and that 
their the degree of foreign exchange exposure has not diminished over time—suggesting that hedging options 
remain limited. 
26See Agénor (1991) for a more detailed discussion. As discussed in that paper, for a policymaker 
concerned with both inflation and competitiveness, the desirability of “tying one's hands” as a solution to the 
time inconsistency problem depends on what one's hands are tied to. When union members have stable, low 
inflation rates, precommitment to a fixed exchange rate may help demonstrate domestic resolve to maintaining 
   50
equivalent to appointing a “conservative” central banker, highly averse to inflation (see 
Rogoff (1985)).  The weaker the political institutions are, the more desirable it is for the 
authorities to adopt an institutional arrangement that imposes large (political or otherwise) 
costs on reneging on it.  Put differently, because joining a monetary union imposes 
irrevocably fixed exchange rates (or at least rates that are very difficult to change), it may 
provide a “quick gain” in credibility. 
 
A.2 Costs Associated with Currency Unions 
   
Costs associated with joining a currency union relate essentially to the use of the 
exchange rate as a policy instrument, particularly in the presence of large external shocks. 
Depending on the nature of these costs, a country's commitment to the “rules of the game” of 
a monetary union may lack credibility—thereby hampering the extent to which membership 
in a union can overcome time inconsistency problems.  
 
A.2.1 Loss of Monetary Independence 
 
From the standpoint of an individual country, the most important cost of a currency 
union is the loss of monetary independence. When effective, an independent monetary policy 
can be used as a stabilization tool, in order to dampen cyclical fluctuations. As discussed later, 
the greater the degree of asymmetry of shocks across countries, and the more limited 
alternative adjustment mechanisms are to these shocks, the greater the cost associated with the 
loss of monetary independence. 
 
However, as argued by Grubel (2005), the loss of monetary sovereignty that joining a 
currency union entails may be highly beneficial in some countries, to the extent that it also 
ensures greater independence of monetary policy from political influence. And the more open 
an economy, the more devaluation becomes a source of imported inflation; this may reduce 
significantly the benefits associated with an adjustment via currency changes because 
domestic inflation will mitigate the initial effect of a nominal depreciation on the real 
exchange rate. 
 
Moreover, if the economy of the potential union member is highly dollarized, the cost 
of losing monetary independence may not be as high as it commonly thought. Indeed, if debts 
are denominated largely in foreign currency, and the pass-through from exchange rates to 
prices and foreign-currency liabilities occurs promptly, a nominal depreciation could lead to 
bankruptcies and depression, through large balance sheet effects. Thus, in a dollarized 
economy, adjustment through currency devaluation loses an important advantage over a 
deflationary adjustment, namely, the capacity to dilute the real value of the debt. By 
implication, this suggests that the higher the initial degree of liability dollarization, the less 
the cost of foregoing monetary independence. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
financial discipline. But when the economy is subject to large nominal shocks, the credibility gain may be 
outweighed by the cost of lost autonomy.   51
A.2.1 Flexibility provided by an Alternative Nominal Anchor 
 
Irrevocably fixing a country’s nominal exchange in the context of a currency union is 
not the only way to provide a strong nominal anchor to the economy and constrain monetary 
policy. Countries can impose such constraints by adopting an alternative credible nominal 
anchor, namely the inflation rate itself, as several developing countries have done in recent 
years with relative success (see Gonçalves and Salles (2008)). At the same time, an inflation 
targeting regime allows some degree of monetary independence, thereby providing some 
discretion to respond to (temporary) shocks. However, it is also true that institutional 
requirements for the adoption of inflation targeting are quite demanding, and that the 
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Appendix B 
Data Sources and Unit Root Tests 
 
 
The data underlying the analysis presented in this paper are taken essentially from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the World Bank. 
 
The output gap is measured as the log deviation of real GDP from its trend, with the 
trend value calculated using the modified Baxter-King filter (see Christiano and Fitzgerald 
(2003)).  The output gap for the United States is calculated in a similar fashion. 
 
The inflation rate differential is measured by the difference between domestic inflation 
and inflation in the US; each inflation rate (at an annual rate) is measured in terms of the 
consumer price index. 
 
The US real interest rate is measured as the nominal three-month T-bill rate minus the 
US inflation rate (in terms of consumer prices). 
 
The world price of oil is the price of Brent crude in US dollars. 
 
The bilateral real exchange rate is constructed for each country by taking the nominal 
exchange between the national currency and the US dollar (average over the period,   
converted into an index), multiplied by the US consumer price index, and divided by the 
domestic consumer price index. 
 
The ratio of credit to the private sector is measured as claims of commercial banks on 
the private sector, divided by nominal GDP. 
 
  The unit root tests (based on standard ADF tests) for all the variables used in the basic 
and extended VARX models are reported in Table B1. As can be inferred from the results, the 
null hypothesis of nonstationarity is rejected at 1 percent (critical value) for most of the 
variables, at 5 percent for all but one (the realinterest rate in the US), and at 10 percent for all 
of them. 
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                          Table B1 
ADF Tests in Level  
(With a non zero intercept and no trend) 
      
           
 OIL    -6.164***   
 RATE_US    -2.837*   
 GAP_US_BK    -6.146***   
 CRED_DR    -6.958***   
 CRED_HT    -4.984***   
 GAP_DR_BK    -5.124***   
 GAP_HT_BK    -5.502***   
 DLINFL_DUS_DR    -3.514**   
 DLINFL_DUS_HT    -3.043**   
 RER_DR    -7.747***   
 RER_HT  -4.734***   
           
      
ADF is the Augmented Dickey Fuller t-statistic. 
*** denotes significance at 1 percent;    
** 5 percent; and * at 10 percent.   
The critical values are respectively   
(-3.589, -2.930, and -2.603)       








Alternative Extended VARX Model 
With partially Endogenous Bilateral Real Exchange Rates 
 
 
We extend the basic VARX model of the paper to consider, in addition to the five 
variables above (the output gaps and inflation deviations in the two countries, and the US 
output gap), the following variables:  
 
a) the ratio of credit to GDP in the two countries (which is a measure of the 
availability of loanable funds); 
 
b) the rate of change of the real bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar in both 
countries;  
 
c) the rate of change of a world index of commodity prices (including oil, given that 
both countries are oil importers);  
 
d) the real US 3-month Treasury bill rate (given by the nominal rate deflated by the 
US inflation rate in consumer prices).  
 
For convenience, we rename the US output gap variable as y11t. The degree of 
endogeneity of the new variables, numbered now 5 to 10, is as follows. Variables y5t and y6t, 
the real exchange rates in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, respectively, are taken to be 
partially interactive; they affect directly only the output gap in the respective county. It 
depends only on its lagged value and the output gap. Similarly, variables y7t and y8t,, the credit 
variables in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, respectively, only affect the output gap in the 
respective country, with no direct effect on inflation or the real exchange rate. In addition, it 
also depends only on its lagged value and the output gap, to capture bidirectional causality 
between credit and economic activity. Variable y9t, the rate of change in world commodity 
prices, depends only on its past value(s); it can affect all domestic variables. Variable y10t, The 
US real interest rate, is assumed to depend not only on its past value(s) but also on lagged 
value(s) of the US output gap, which is now y11t. Conversely, the US output gap is also 
assumed to depend now not only on its lagged value but also on the lagged value(s) of the real 
US interest rate and world commodity prices. Thus, the model now accounts for interactions 
between the US variables themselves, and between world commodity prices (including oil) 
and US activity—while maintaining the unidirectional causality between US variables and 
domestic variables in Haiti and the Dominican Republic (y10t and y11t can affect all domestic 
variables). In the same vein as before, all of the partially endogenous variables can affect the 
fully interactive variables. 
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Given the increase in the number of variables, to preserve degrees of freedom, the 
number of lags is restricted uniformly to 1 (m = 0). In matrix form, the extended VARX 






       
 




and the submatrices dij, based on the restrictions defined earlier, are given by
27 
 
                                                               
                                                 
27The dependence of the credit-to-GDP ratio on the (lagged) output gap in the respective 
country, as noted earlier, explains why the submatrix d21 does not contain only zeroes but instead is 
specified as having d71  0 and d82  0.   56
            
 
 
                    
and   57
         
 
 
Based on these matrices, we can calculate as before the gain in terms of degrees of freedom 
that the extended VARX model provides relative to a standard VAR model with no 
restrictions of any sort. This gain is now given by 11*(11+1) – (4*4 + 16 + 4 + 10) = 121 – 46 
= 75. 
 
  The following figures show the impulse response functions, which are broadly similar 
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